




FALL 1977At the outset, it is important to limit the ques-
tions we shall try to address. No attempt will be
made here to argue either for or against any of
the specific provisions of FASB-8. Rather, we
take its existence as given, and simply ask: what
impact has FASB-8 had upon share prices of
multinationals over and above the impact ofthe
recent regime of quasi-floating exchange rates?
In short, has FASB-8 provided investors with
any "new" information on the asset properties of
claims on multinationals? The answer given here
will be a qualified "yes."
John H. Makin*
In October 1975, the Financial Accounting since March 1973. For multinationals, such
Standards Board (FASB) issued a statement flexibility meant increased variability ofthe dol-
(Statement No.8) designed to standardize pro- lar value of foreign-currency items on balance
cedures for reporting foreign-currency positions sheets and income statements, with possibly in-
of U.S. multinationals. FASB-8 prompted a creased variability of net earnings. This fact
stormofprotest from many ofthese firms, which should have been fully appreciated by investors
argued that it would result in violent swings in well before FASB-8 went into effect in January
reported earnings not related to thefundamental 1976. Therefore we need to look for possible ef-
economic condition ofa firm. Any such volatility fects of floating per se on costs ofequity capital
ofearnings would, in the view ofa widely accept- for multinationals, and then see ifany additional
ed body offinancial theory, penalize share prices effects can be attributedto FASB-8.
ofmultinationals and therebyincrease their costs
of raising capital. In opposition, some analysts
argue that investors can be expected to "see
through" reported earnings figures to distinguish
between fluctuations due to "fundamentals" and
those due to accounting standards which don't
reflectsuch "fundamentals."
Despite the obvious inconsistency between
these polar views, no systematic statistical test
has been made to date of FASB-8's effect upon
share prices of multinationals. This reflects the
fact that the new standards have only been in ef-
fect since January 1976, and that few companies
had previously followed the accounting proce- We first describe briefly in Section 1 the na-
dures mandated by FASB-8. Sufficient data are ture of the accounting changes mandated by
now available to test for the effects of FASB-8 FASB-8. In Section 2, we consider the impact
upon the costs ofcapital for multinationals. The which FASB-8 might produce on share prices of
results ofsuch tests are reported in this study. multinationals, over and above the impact result-
Any such study must recognize that FASB-8 ing from the increased flexibility of exchange
standards were super-imposed upon a system of rates. Section 3introduces the methodology used
quasi-floating exchange rates which permitted to test for this impact; Section 4 presents the
various degrees of exchange-rate flexibility, se- findings ofour empirical tests; and Section 5dis-
lectively since August 1971 and more widely cusses the implications ofthese findings.
I. Floating: A New Era for Multinationals
Multinational corporations attract a great sider how multinationals aredifferent from other
deal ofattention because ofthe public's fascina- firms, and in particular, which differences are es-
tion with their size and power.' Itis useful to con- sential for measuring corporate performance.
*Associate Professor of Economics, University of Washington, and Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
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44Multinationals are corporations which find it
advantageous to locate their sales, manufactur-
ing, marketing orfinancial activities in a number
of different countries. Their major advantages
include economies of scale from intensive em-
ployment of indivisible and highly specialized
managerial functions, preferential location vis-a-
vis major markets or suppliers ofinputs, perhaps
some ability to avoid govemmental restrictions
on operations and, more generally, various bene-
fits flowing from a widely diversified set of
operations.
Multinational organizations do, however, face
unique costs. Basic problems arise from attempt-
ing to manage a far-flung organization whose
lines ofcommunication are frequently stretched
to the point of extreme frailty. In terms of our
main concern, a multinational presence implies a
considerable increase in the complexity offinan-
cial statements. On the balance sheet, those
items dealing with debt, inventories and physical
plant-manyofwhich are measured in different
currencies-must all be converted back into the
basecurrency employed by the firm for account-
ing purposes. The same is true of all the flow
items in the income account, some ofwhich must
reflect changes in the value of balance-sheet
items, measured in terms ofsome basecurrency.
The problems involved in producing informa-
tive financial statements for multinationals be-
come more complicated under flexible exchange
rates. The large adjustments of exchange rates
after August 1971 and the openly-acknowledged
continuous adjustments since March 1973 have
made this fact amply clear to financial managers
and investors. FASB-8 represents an attempt to
replace those accountingstandards that had been
designed for a regime of fixed-exchange rates
with standards more appropriate to a regime of
flexible-exchange rates, and moreover, to stan-
dardize the diversity ofaccounting practices fol-
lowed by multinationals in this period ofadapta-
tion to flexible rates.
FASB-8 requires quarterlyincome statements
to report changes in the local-currency value of
balance-sheet items, some of which may repre-
sent unrealized gains or losses.2Italso standard-
izes the treatment ofa number ofmajor balance-
sheet items. For example, all "nonmonetary"
items, such asdepreciation andcost ofgoods sold
(including inventories), are translated into dol-
larsat"historical" exchange rates; i.e., those pre-
vailing when inventory was acquired or when a
plant was built. In contrast, all "monetary"
items, such as long-term debt denominated in
foreign currencies, are translated into dollars at
"current" rates. As a result, quarterly income
figures become highly vulnerable to changes in
the dollar value of large stock items such as in-
ventories and debt. Forexample, for goods priced
in foreign currencies, a strengthening ofthe U.S.
dollar could lower the dollar value ofcurrent re-
ceipts relative to the dollar cost ofgoods sold, and
thus could reduce measured net dollar earnings.
Alternatively, the same stronger dollar could re-
duce the value oflong-term debt denominated in
foreign currency, and thus could lead to higher
net dollar earnings. In sum, the effects ofFASB-
8 can be large and unpredictable. An assessment
of their effects on future earnings reports re-
quires detailed information about corporate bal-
ance sheets and income statements, as well as
forecasts ofexchange rates.
Priorto theenactmentofFASB-8, accounting
practices ofU.s. multinationals varied consider-
ably, particularly regarding translation rates
(current vs. historical) for inventory and long-
term debt.3 More important, most companies
employed "reserve accounts" to absorb the im-
pact of changes in the dollar value of balance-
sheet items due to exchange-rate changes, there-
by preventing such changes from appearing on
quarterly income statements. The dollar value of
these changes, plus or minus, could be accumu-
lated over time and reported out on the income
statementwhen theimpact was as small as possi-
ble, thereby minimizing the impact ofexchange-
rate changes on reported net earnings. With
many multinationals having become accustomed
to using reserve accounts in this fashion to stabi-
lize reported earnings, thestormofprotest which
greeted FASB-8 is not surprising.
II. FASB-8: Additional Problem for Multinationals?
The potential for increased earnings variabil-
ity (measured in U.S. dollars) arises from the in-
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creased flexibility ofexchange rates, quite inde-
pendently ofa particular set ofaccounting stan-dards. Investors are well aware of this fact, and
also ofthe use ofreserve accounts to smooth out
the impact upon reported earnings of exchange-
rate fluctuations. In this situation, does the en-
actment of FASB-8 place any added burden on
multinationals over and above the burden im-
plied by exchange-rate flexibility? Was the cry
ofprotest over FASB-8 justified? Before consid-
ering this question, we should first consider what,
if any, burden is implied for mutinationals by a
move toward exchange-rate flexibility perse.
Two assumptions are involved in the hypoth-
esis that the increased earnings variability asso-
ciated with a move toward floating exchange
rates will raise capital costs for multinationals.
First, we assume that anincrease in the permissi-
ble flexibility of exchange rates implied by re-
duced official intervention in foreign-exchange
markets-which defines our current system of
quasi-floating-will result in an increase in the
actualflexibility of exchange rates.4 Second, we
assume that an increase in actual rate flexibility
raises the variance of multinationals' profits
measured in dollars.5 Neither proposition is nec-
essarily true. Thefirst depends on conditions af-
fecting the private demand and supply offoreign
exchange, as well as the level ofcentral-bank in-
tervention under our quasi-floating system. Even
granting the first assumption, however, the vari-
ance of multinationals' net dollar profits can rise
or fall depending upon the variability and covar-
iability of dollar prices of currencies in which
foreign-currency positions exist.6
For purposes of exploring the impact of in-
creased rate flexibility, however, we will take
these two propositions to be empirically valid.
Exchange rates in recent years have in fact fluc-
tuated more, at least on a quarter-to-quarter ba-
sis, than during the pre-August 1971 era of
"fixed" exchange rates. And although multina-
tionals have the potential ofminimizing theearn-
ings impact of exchange-rate variability, they
have made only limited progress in this
direction.7
In this situation, would the application of
FASB~8 tend to raise multinationals' capital
costs further than would be expected on the basis
of the increased flexibility of exchange rates?
For comparisons of multinationals with purely
domestic firms, the answer depends upon wheth-
er pre-FASB-8 accounting standards provide an
accurate measure ofearnings behavior over time,
and whether more accurate measures can be de-
vised. For comparisons among multinationals,
the answer depends upon whether reported earn-
ings figures can be standardized by adjusting for
differences in accounting techniques and in the
use ofreserve accounts.
Answers to these questions can be sought with
the aid ofa model which relates returns on secu-
rities both to a systematic (or overall) market
component of risk and to an unsystematic (or
nonmarket) component ofrisk. We seek to deter-
mine how these two risk components are affected
by the increased flexibility of exchange rates,
and subsequently by the impact of FASB-8 on
corporateearnings reports.
III. Measuring the ImpactofFASB-8
It is well know that movements in the overall
stock market significantly affect returns on indi-
vidual stocks. Thus, in testing for the effects of
floating and FASB-8, it is necessary to adjust the
returns ofthe companies being tested for move-
ments in the overall market. This section briefly
describes one widely-accepted method for taking
account ofmarketmovements.
Modern financial theory, as developed by W.
F. Sharpe and others, has shown the relationship
between the rate ofreturn on an individual secu-
rity or portfolio and the overall "market return"
in thefollowing form:8
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(I) E[Rjtl = a + /3j E[Rmtl + ~t where
E[Rjtl =the expected rate of return on se-
curity "j" or portfolio "j" at time
"1"
E[Rmtl =the expected rate of return on the
market portfolioattime"t"
/3j =a parameter describing the sensi-
tivity of E[Rjl to changes in
E[Rm]
a =a measure of the expected return
to portfolio "j" in excess of or be-
low the average market return re-quired for thejthrisk class
Et = the impact ofrandom or "outside"
disturbanceson Rj at time "t"
Viewed in a straightforward manner, equa-
tion (1) says thatchanges in the expected return
on a given asset or portfolio occur because of
changes in the overall expected return on all
risky assets, E[Rml, and because of changes in
"other" factors peculiar to such a given asset or
portfolio which are captured in turn by a change
in "a", if they persist, or by Et if they are essen-
tially random and do not persist. Portfolio risk or
movement in E[Rjl that is correlated with re-
turnson risky assets for which the market portfo-
lio is a surrogate is termed systematicrisk, while
that which is uncorrelated is termed non-system-
atic risk. Systematic risk is an unavoidable re-
sponse of E[Rjl to changes in the overall return
on assets, while non-systematic risk ought, in
theory, to be avoidable through portfolio
diversification.
The relationship given by equation (1) is usu-
ally called the securitymarketline. It is derived
from a consideration of the choices made by in-
vestors ofwhich assets to hold in their portfolios.
Presumably, investors will demand a higher ex-
pected return from a portfolio which they per-
ceive to be riskier (Le., to have more variable re-
turns). As each investor buys and sells securities
in order to put together the portfolio which best
satisfies his preferences for return vs. risk, the
market prices ofsecurities will adjust until equa-
tion (1) is satisfied.
The model just described can be employed to
test for the impact offloating and FASB-8 upon
costs of capital for multinationals, relative to
other firms, by substituting actual measures of
past returns for the expected values in equation
(1).9 When this is done, the "a" and "fJ" terms
retain the interpretation given them in equation
(I), except for the substitution of"actual" where
"expected" had previously been employed.
Floating and/or FASB-8 may tend to cause
changes in either "a" or "fJ". Either event would
be likely to affect overall market risk, in view of
the heavy concentration of multinationals in the
ranks ofmajor U.S. firms. In such a case, some
component of the overall movement in returns
would reflect the impact of changes in foreign-
exchange rates. Multinational firms would tend
to be particularly sensitive to the (new) foreign-
exchange component of market risk, and there-
fore returns to multinational equities would tend
to respond more sharply to changes in market re-
turns, at least to the extent that such changes re-
flect the foreign-exchange component of market
risk. Inshort, "fJ" may rise either after floating or
FASB-8.
Alternatively, if either floating or FASB-8
causes "a" to vary significantly from zero, then
expost, over the sample period in question, some
persistent, exogenous "non-market" disturbance
must be at work. Such a disturbance mayor may
not be associated with a change in "fJ," depend-
ing upon whether or not it is associated with a
change in perceived systematic ("market") risk.
A negative value of"a" with no significant shift
in "fJ" would suggest the existence ofnew infor-
mation, causing a persistent reduction in the
market's perceived value ofmultinational firms.
Costs ofraising a given amount ofcapital, which
would now represent a larger shareofsuchfirms'
discounted presentvalue, would then rise.
In contrast, negative error terms at a particu-
larpoint in time would suggest a one-time reduc-
tion in ex postreturns on multinationals' shares
as a result offloating or FASB-8. In anycase, the
results obtained by estimating equation (1) for
various portfolios ofmultinationals, along with a
control group ofdomestic firms, indicate the de-
gree to which these events affected the multina-
tionals' costs ofcapital.
IV. Empirical Tests of theImpactof FASB-8
Our empirical tests use Equation (1) to mea- the large FASB-8 impact upon their earnings.
sure the performance of share prices of three The five time periods investigated are the "fixed
groups offirms over five time periods. The firms exchange-rate" period (January 7,1970 through
investigated include a control group of non-mul- August II, 1971), the "transition" period (Au-
tinational firms (trucking), a group of multina- gust 25, 1971 through March 21, 1973), and
tionals influenced to some extent by FASB-8 three subsequent "floating" periods-the "float-
(chemicals, international oils and drugs), and a ing without FASB-8" period (April 4, 1973
"sensitive" group selected specifically because of through October 15, 1975), the "floating with
47FASB-8 expected" period (October 22, 1975
through March 31, 1976) and finally the "float-
ing with FASB-8" period (April 7, 1976 through
March 30,1977).
The grouping of firms is designed to distin-
guish between the performance ofmultinationals
andthatofdomestic firms, and to distinguish be-
tween the performance of"typical" multination-
alsand that of more "sensitive" firms. Since
"floating" alone could adversely affect perfor-
mance, we measure their actions during the
fixed-rate period and again during each of the
two periods of quasi-floating after August 15,
1971. Since FASB-8 was officially adopted on
October 15, 1975 to apply effectively to first-
quarter 1976 earnings reports, we consider also
the period from October 22, 1975 through
March 31, 1976, when FASB-8's existence was
known but before the appearance of any first-
quarter earnings figures. In effect, this period
isolates any impact arising from the application
of a known form of FASB-8. The final period
from April 7, 1976 through the end ofour sam-
ple, March 30, 1977, tests for the "new informa-
tion'" ifany, that was contained in actual earn-
ings reports under FASB-8 that were then
beginning to appear.
The control group "trucking" is Standard and
Poor's stock index offive trucking firms. 10 Selec-
tion ofthis "non-multinational" control group re-
quired a careful search, because almost any
grouping of major U.s.-based firms contains a
significant multinational component, and multi-
national firms dominate the Fortune 500 list of
major corporations.11 However, the S & P
"trucking"group is a readily available composite
with virtually no multinational involvement. .
The "typical" multinational group was select-
ed on the basis of substantial multinational in-
volvement ofthe firms in certain S & P compos-
ites. Chemicals, drugs and international oil
companies were most consistently represented in
samples of major multinationals, as is evident
from the listings in the Appendix. The "sensitive"
group ofmultinationals was selected to represent
those firms whose earnings reports during 1976
were most clearly affected by the application of
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FASB-8 standards.12 Those firms vary signifi-
cantly in terms of size and industry grouping,
and exposttheir only common characteristic is a
high level of sensitivity to FASB-8 standards. 13
The "negative impact on earnings under FASB-
8" (Table 1) measures the ratio of the change in
earnings under FASB-8 to what total earnings
would have been under previous accounting
rules. For example, the 1976 per share earnings
of American Brands were 28 percent less under
FASB-8 than they would have been under pre-
vious accounting rules. In short, Table 1suggests
the degree to which FASB-8 affected the earn-
ings ofthe"sensitive" group.
Application of FASB-8 standards apparently
depressed earnings for most U.S. multinationals
during 1976. This result reflected both the par-
ticular form ofthe standards and the behavior of
the U.S. dollar during that period-and as most
corporate reports carefully pointed out, the im-
pact could subsequentiy be reversed given differ-
ent exchange-rate behavior. Negative earnings
effects under FASB-8 during 1976 possibly re-
flected theconjunction ofa generally strengthen-
ing U.S. dollar and the multinationals' typically
heavy investment abroad in inventories, plant
and equipment. Circumstances of this type raise
the cost of goods~sold relative to sales receipts
when each is measured in U.S. dollars, and there-
by lower corporate profit margins. Should the
U.S. dollar weaken consistently during 1977, the
losses recorded under FASB-8 in 1976 would be-
come gains. The overall impact would be in-
creasedvolatilityofreported net earnings.
It should be emphasized that the earnings of
firms in the "sensitive" group are generally ex-
pected to be more variable under FASB-8, and
not necessarily higher or lower. While the
FASB-8 impact was universally negative during
1976, overallearnings figures for the firms in Ta-
ble 1varied considerably during that year. Seven
of the thirteen reported higher earnings in the
first quarterof1976 than in thecomparable peri-
od of 1975. Earnings performance for the "sensi-
tive" group as a whole, which had lagged behind
the overall corporate average in earlier years,
continued to do so in 1976 (Table 2).
"Relative earnings growth" remained rela-tively stable over the 1975-76 period. Relative
earnings growth is thedifference between overall
corporate earnings performance, as measured by
the percentage change in current quarterly earn-
ings over those for a year earlier, and that for the
"sensitive" group, divided by overall earnings
performance. (The one exception, in the third
quarter of 1975, reflected the very small im-
provement in overall earnings in thatquarter.) In
contrast, the absolute difference in performance
between overall earnings and sensitive-group
earnings generally widened over the two-year pe-
riod. However, the figure for first-quarter
1976-a crucial period for earnings variability
under FASB-8-was less than a third ofa stan-
dard deviation from the mean absolute differ-
ence for the 1975-76 period.14 In short, there was
nothing particularly unusual in the first quarter
of 1976 about the levelofearnings performance
of the "sensitive" group relative to the level of
overall corporate-earnings performance.
Next, by considering movements within dif-
ferent time periods, we try to distinguish between
the impact on share prices associated with float-
ing perseand the impact resulting from the ex-
pected or actual application ofFASB-8. The two
earlier ("fixed rate" and"transition") periods are
rather clearly delineated. (See p.47 above.) In
contrast, it is difficult to identify a date when we
might expect that FASB-8 would begin to affect
the share prices ofmultinationals. The Financial
Accounting Standards Board began preliminary
consideration of new standards for muitination-
als inApril 1973. Therefollowed a series ofexpo-
sure drafts, memos and public hearings,·and
FASB-8 was officially released on October 15,
1975. By the end of 1974 analysts generally ex-
pected that new regulations would be forthcom-
ing, although a powerful negative reaction by
multinationals to FASB's Exposure Draft ofDe-
cember 31, 1974 caused some to anticipate a
fairly significant softening of the terms in that
draft. Because of such continuing uncertainty,
we would expect any possible effects of FASB-8
to surface only when the new standards had be-
come "official"-hence our specific identifica-
tion ofthe period from October 22, 1975 through
March 31, 1976 as "floating with FASB-8 ex-
Table 1
The EffectofFASB-8 Accounting Standardson
1976Reported Earningsof"Sensitive Firms"
Impact(% jon1976
Earnings Resulting Rank in Assets
from FASB-8 Standards* Fortune500 (billions)d Industry andSICCode
1. American Brands 28 (EPS)c 57 $2.456 Tobacco (21 )
2. Armco Steel 12a (NI) 50 $2.834 Primary metals (33)
3. Bell & Howell "a (EPS) 338 $ .408 Photographic (38)
4. Celanese 13 (NI) 85 $1.910 Chemicals (28)
5. Chemetron 25 (NI) 336 $ .412 Chemicals (28)
6. Chicago Pneumatic 39 (NI/EPS) 531 $ .255 AirTransport (45)
7. Eastman Kodak 8.6 (EPS) 22 $5.524 Photographic (38)
8. Ferro 17 (NI) 445 $ .246 Chemicals (28)
9. Gardner Denver 20a (EPS) 332 $ .416 Air Transport (45)
10. Gillette 20 (NI) 170 $1.071 Fabricated Metal Products (34)
I I. Hoover 59 (EPS) 341 $ .391 Electrical Equipment (36)
12. Norton 13 (EPS/NIl 295 $ .483 Stone, Clay, (32)
Glass andConcrete
13. Sherwin Williams 15 (EPS) 266 $ .587 Petroleum Refining & (28)
Related Industries
Group Average 21.6 140b $1.307
a. First three quarters of 1976.
b. Rank offirm in Fortune 500 with comparable (1.307 b.) assets.
c. Percent reduction in earnings per share (EPS) or net income (NI) due specifically to the implementation of FASB-8
standards.
d. Source: Fortune 500 list ofU.S. firms in 1976.
*Negative
49Thus, until late April 1976, many firms and in-
vestors still had reason to believe that FASB-8
would be rescinded or altered. Again, many fi-
nancial managers remained unconvinced that in-
vestors had already discounted into share prices
(prior to FASB-8's enactment) all the informa-
tion which its application might be expected to
reveaL
pected." Inotherwords, wewould expect that the
maximumiI1lpact fromanticipationofFASB-8,
as opposed toits actual application, would arise
onlyafterthis "official" release,whenthespecif-
iccontentofthe regulations had been absorbed
byanalysts.
Two events distinguishedthebeginning ofthe
"FASB-8" period. Firstwas the appearance of
the initial setofearnings reports prepared under
FASB~8.standards. Second was .•the crucial
FASBdecision(April29, 1976) nottore-consid-
er the "col1troversial" standards contained in
FAS~-8 .• Il1.reporting .the decision,· the Wall
StreetJournaJobserved:
Thestandard( FASB-8) has drawn more
criticism than any other issued by the
three-year-oldstandards board, the private
sector's top authority on accounting rules.
Business critics contend that the new rule
introduces erratic and meaningless fluctu-
ations in earnings that will only confuse in-
vestors. Some companies have protested to
the Securities and Exchange Commission






(l}overfivetime periods arereported in Table 3.
Rjt, thereturnonportfolio j, is measured bythe
rateofchangeofthepriceofportfo.ioJat timet;




cal" multinational.portfolios are taken from
Standard & Poor'svalue~weighted indices, and
the priceofthe "sensitive"portfolioismeasured
bothas the average and the value~weightedaver~
age ofthe share prices of the 13 firms listed in
Table 1.17
The results reported here suggestthatthe only
significant and persistent impact upon multina~
tionaI share prices occurred in the "sensitive"
group, and then only during the" FASB~8" peri~
od (ApriI1976~March 1977). Duringthat peri~
od, three factors were present together for the
first time-the adoption of FASB~8, theavail~
ability of new earnings reports and the Account~
ing Board's reiteration of its intention to stand
firm on the new standards. Our results for the
"sensitive" group suggest a reduction in the ex
postannual rateofreturn during the FASB~8 pe~
riod ofabout one half of one percent below that
for a typical portfolio with the same market risk
(measured by "{3").18 This outcome is based upon
the significant negative level for the estimated
value of "a" for a weighted portfolio of "sensi~
tive" firms in the "after FASB~8" time period-
see column (5) in the "weighted-sensitive" group.
Such a result implies that some force exogenous
Table 2
EarningsPerformanceof"Sensitive"Group Relative













1 Earnings performanceis measured by the percentagechange in quarterlyearningsover the quarterly figure for a yearearlier.
Sources: U.S. DepartmentofCommerce, Commerce News, July 21, 1977 for overall corporateearnings and WallStreetJournal,
various issues, for earningsofthesensitive group.
50to overall market factors persistently depressed
the performance of "sensitive" shares beginning
in April, 1976. This result is also apparent from
plots of indices of these share prices against the
S&P 500 from January, 1975 through March,
1977 (Chart 1). Since the appearance ofthis de-
pressive factor coincided with the appearance of
the first set of earnings reports under FASB-8
and the FASB's reaffirmation of its new stan-
dards, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
share prices in this group were depressed by an
increase in their perceived riskiness. Such firms
would have to offer risk-averse investors subse-
quent issues ofshares at a lower price, and would
therefore experience a higher cost of raising
capital.
Our conclusions are strengthened by two fac-
tors which reduce the probability that the ob-
served behavior ofthe "sensitive" group was due
to some phenomenon not related to the impact of
foreign-exchange risk on expected variability of
earnings. First, the diversity in size and industry-
mix of the "sensitive" group sharply reduces the
probability that some other unspecified event
common to all companies could have depressed
their expected rates of return after April 1976
(Table 1). Second, the fact that the earnings per-
formance of the "sensitive" group, relative to
that of all U.S. corporations, was fairly steady
over the period (Table 2), suggests that a rise in
expected. earnings variability-not a fall in the
expected level ofearnings--depressed the "sensi-
tive" group's expected returns in the FASB-8 pe-
riod. In short, an alternative explanation for the
behavior of the firms in the "sensitive" group
would have to include identification ofsome oth-
er event(s) which reduced their attractiveness
afterApril 1976.
Despite the previous reference to rising values
of "{3" as a possible result of floating rates, that
effect was not evident in the one-year post-
FASB-8 period. "(3" rOse in various "floating"
periods for the chemical and drug groupings, but
it also rose for the control (trucking) group while
failing to rise significantlyfor the rest ofthe mul-
tinationals. The impact of floating on market
rates apparently was not powerful enough to af-
fect the responsiveness ofmultinational shares to
market volatility, to an extent that would domi-
nate the usual instability of"{3" values for indus-
try aggregates over relatively short periods of
time.
Seveial othei conclusions emerge from the re-
sults reported in Table 3. "Floating" rates per se
apparently produced no significant and persis-
tent negative pressure on share prices of any
group of multinationals. In view of the consider-























Fixed Transition Pre- Expected After Overall
FASB"8 FASB-8 FASB-8
1/70- 8/71- 3/73- 10/75- 3/76- 1/70-
8/71 3/73 10/75 3/76 3/77 3/77
(i) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Multinationals
(Truckers)
ex .0059 .0028 .0044 ~.0024 -.0030 .0031
(1.67) (.96) (1.28) (.35) (.75) (1.84)
~ .885 1.330 1.110 .858 .616 1.042
(5.32) (7.37) (9.37) (2.22) (2.39) (13.83)
iF .25 .39 .40 .15 .08 .34
DW 1.52 1.58 2.24 2.10 1.98 1.99
SEE .0321 .0270 .0390 .0310 .0289 .0332
"Typical" Multinationals
(Chemicals)
ex .0026 .000 .0029 .0015 -.00335 .0012
(1.66) (00) (1.82) (.46) (1.51) (1.54)
~ .809 1.090 1.080 1.200 1.077 1.033
"R2
(10.97) (13.78) (19.49) (6.56) (7.55) (28.93)
.59 .70 .74 .66 .52 .69
DW 1.94 1.70 1.54 1.77 1.50 1.61
SEE .0142 .0120 .0180 .0150 .0160 .0157
(Drugs)
ex .0002 .0033 -.0004 -.0042 -.0035 -.0002
(.17) (2.43) (.22) (.73) (1.82) (.27)
~ .891 .956 1.11 .845 1.290 1.055
(14.81) (11.55) (18.37) (2.67) (10.47) (28.06)
"R2 .73 .62 .72 .22 .68 .68
DW 1.34 1.40 1.50 1.50 1.46 1.47
SEE .0116 .0120 .0200 .0250 .0140 .0166
(International Oils)
ex .0012 .0014 .0003 -.0015 .0026 .0007
(.45) (.73) (.14) (.46) (1.39) (.71)
~ .900 .789 .876 .884 .929 .854
(6.95) (6.96) (13.56) (4.77) (7.64) (18.54)
"R2 .37 .37 .58 .50 .53 .48
RW 2.24 2.13 1.98 1.16 1.68 2.05
SEE .0250 .0170 .0210 .0150 .0140 .0203
"Sensitive" Multinationals
(weighted)
ex .0009 .005 -.0001 .0004 -.00975 -.0004
(.32) (1.89) (.09) (.09) (3.35) (.29)
~ 1.02 1.12 1.21 1.15 1.18 1.18
(8.23) (7.24) (14.61) (4.19) (6.36) (20.77)
"R2 .45 .39 .62 .42 .44 .53
DW 2.55 1.96 2.31 2.26 2.23 2.21
SEE .0230 .0230 .0280 .0220 .0200 .0250
(unweighted)
ex .00 -.0013 -.0003 .0019 -.0034 -.0005
(00) (1.23) (.23) (.83) (2.43) (.83)
~ .938 .981 .851 1.04 .808 .900
(17.48) (14.62) (20.06) (7.94) (8.95) (32.83)
iF .79 .72 .76 .73 .61 .74
DW 2.01 1.98 1.93 1.14 1.90 1.94
SEE .QIOO .0099 .0140 .0107 .0101 .0120
52able in the pre-FASB-8period in the use of re-
serveaccountsandin theapplication ofhistorical
or cu.rrent exchange rates·to balance-sheetvalu-
ations, analysts mayhave becomepersuadedthat
floating rates needn'tincrease profits variability
for multicurrency firms. Alternatively, the ef-
fects offloating rates on multinational share
prices mayhave been spread widelyenough,over
time andaCross firms, sothatstatisticallysignifi-
cant shifts in performance would become diffi-
cultto detect at any single point in time. Inspec-
tion ofthe error terms in the regressions
undedyirtgTable3 supports the latter hypothesis,
since thestandarderroroftheestimate tended to
rise when moving from the "fixed" to the "early
floating" and "generalfloating" periods.
The expected application of FASH-8 appar-
ently had little impact in the fourth ofthe five
time periods, although to some slight extent, in-
vestors may haveanticipated a more harmful im-
pact of FASB-8 on oil-company earnings during
that period than was justified by the actual re-
sults which later appeared. The data strongly
suggest, however, that the events surrounding
the application of FASB-8 caused investors to
downgrade multinationals in the "sensitive"
group. In other words, FASB-8 strongly affected
relative returns within the multinational group,
although a broad aggregate index of multina-
tionals would likely show little if any deteriora-
tion relative to domestics in this respect. These
results are reinforced bythe sharp departure, in
lateApril 1976, of share prices ofthe weighted
andunweighted "sensitive" group from a patll
which had previously followed movements ofthe
S&P500(Chart 1).
The more pronounced earnings response of
the"weighted~sensitive"group suggests(}f
course that the larger firms ill the sample·were
more powerfully affected. This is confirmed by
the estimation ofequation (1) for each ofthe 13
companies in thisgroup~especially Eastman
Kodak,which performed very much like theval-
ue-weighted "sensitive"group as a whole.19 Why
shou.ld .shares•of relatively large firms-which
suffer a smaller impact in percentageterms-re-
spond more sharply to an expected increase in
earnings volatility reported under FASB-8? The
proximate answer is that the results under the
new standards were more ofa "surprise"for rela-
tively large firms than for smaller firms. Perhaps
analysts anticipated more ofa rise in the volatil-
ity of earnings for relatively small firms under
FASB-8, while at the same time expecting no
significant impact upon earnings volatility for
larger firms. Further, the rise in expected volatil-
ityprobably was relatively large for large firms
when compared with past volatility. For smaller
finns, the larger absolute effect under FASB-8
was morefully anticipated and relatively less sig-
nificant when compared with past levels ofearn-
ingsvolatility.
V. Concluding Observations
The application of FASB-8-mandated ac-
counting standards has apparently produced few
unanticipated effects on earnings, and therefore
on share prices, of typical multinational firms
such as the oils, drugs and chemicals. The perfor-
mance of such groupings is generally indistin-
guishable from thatofa control group ofdomes-
tic firms-whether in the face of "floating", an-
ticipation ofFASB-8, or actual application of
that new standard. OUf results suggest, however,
that earnings reports which resulted from appli-
cation of FASB-8 did provide new information
which helped investors distinguish between mul-
tinational groupings regarding the impact ofex-
change-rate adjustments upon (actual and ex-
pected) volatility ofreported net dollar earnings.
The new standards are significant, then, not so
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much because of their specific form but because
they apply a single standard to all multination-
als, and thereby enable the market to judgemore
accurately the relative performance of firms
within the overall multinational grouping. Prior
to the application of FASB-8 standards, cross
comparisons between multinationals were very
difficult, because of different conventions re-
garding the use of reserve accounts and the em-
ployment of histofical or current exchange rates
for translation·of such balance-sheet items·as
long-termdebt, inventories and physical plant.
Given the problems which some firms encoun-
ter under FASB-8, it can be argued that they
should leave diversification of forei~n-exchange
risks tothe investment community, which would
choose among claims on a group of firms whosef()rtllIl.eS are weakly correlated so as to cushion
tlleirnpact offoreign-.exchange gains and losses
on portfolio values. This diversification argu-
mentpresumes, however, that investors possess
verydetailed accounting information about mul-
tinationals, are able almost immediately to fore-
see accurately the impact ofexpected exchange-
ratecllan.ges upon the value of a collection of
theirsbares, and are able to act subsequently to
rial behavior ofmultinational firms. Nothing in
our findings specifically suggests that multina-
tionals as a group should expend much effort to
alter the specific form of accounting standards.
The important thing is that the same standards
be applied to all firms. Beyond that, accounting
standards can do little to change the fact that
multinationals' netcash flows (expressed in some
nUJllerairequrrency) become subject to variation
bid Il.).ultinational share prices to levels which ful- \Vheneverexchangerates move up ordown. Man-
lyreflect such information. Given the high cost agersCallllQtesCape the fact, for example, that if
ofQbtaining such information and given the con- they have borrowed large amounts of deutsch-
siderabl<rpressures from boards of directors, fi- Il.).al;ksl.>u11191dQnly dollar~denominated receiv-
nancial officers in multinational firms can prob- abIes>and assets, an appreciation of deutsch-
al.>ly be excused for taking little consolation in marks against the dollar will force them to
the investor-diversification argument. At the allocate mQreof their dollar receipts simply to
very least, some period of time may be required payQff thedeutschmark liability. Consideration
to gather the information necessary to make the ofproblems ofthis sQrt may suggest to managers
new system operable. FASB-8 can have-and ofmultinationals that, like it or not, they are in
undoubtedly has had-powerful short-run impli- the foreign-exchange business. Consequently,
cations for the cost of capital of certain individ- theYIl.).l,l.yfindan attractive return at the margin
ualmultinationalfirms. 20 iftheyutiIi;z;etheir resources to minimize the im-
Finally, some consideration should be given to pactofex:<;hange-rate fluctuations on net earn-
the implications of our findings for the manage- illgsexpressedinlocal currencies.
FOOTNOTES
1. See for example, Global Reach: The Power of the Multlna-
tlonlilis by R. J. Barnet and R. E. Muller (Simon & Schuster, New
York. 1975). for 1I somewhat more even-handed treatment, see R.
Vernon, Storm overthe Multinationals: The Real Issues (Harvard
Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1977).
2. For a detailed description of the new standards see FASB's
Statement of Finance Standards No.8, October 1975, Financial
Accounting Standards Board, Stamford, Connecticut. A useful dis-
cussion of the new standards and their background is given by
Burns (1976).
3.. Fora survllY ofsuch practices see Rodriguez (1977).
4. Itmay be that the very existence of a higher level of permissi-
ble flllxibility of exchange rates will cause investors, for a time at
least,to expect more exchange rate variability and more earnings
variability, thereby leading to a demand for high rates of return on
shares ofmultinationals.
5. This argument Ilbout the "costs" of floating was advance by
Lanyi(1969).
6. •SeeMlikin(1977) for a proofand furtherdiscussion.
7.·Of!:'oursefirms hedge receivables or payables in forward mar-
kets and frequllntly borrow lind lend to reduce exposure. But ef-
forts have generallybeen confined to a currency-by-currency hedg-
ingstratllgyrather than moving to a comprehensive hedging
strategy, For a discussion of such strategies see Makin (1976)
(19n)·
8. For a derivation of equation (I) and a fuller discussion of its
meaning see Sharpe (1970). A good conceptual discussion ap-
pellrsin Sl'lllrpe(1972).
9. Expected rlltes of return represented in equation (I) will be
measured, for use in empirical tests below, by actual rates of
change of share prices. Dividends are not included in calculations
of expected returns since we are interested in behavior of share
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prices Of multinationals relative to share prices in general and to a
control group of n()n multi-nationals. There is no reason to expect a
sYlltllmati!:' differllnce in dividend policies between such broad ag-
gregate firm groupings, and therefore consistent omission of divi-
dendshOuld not affect the relative rates of return on multinational
sl'lllres.ForthellPplication ofthe market model to actual (ex post)
datll,seeJensen (1969).
10. .All groups offirms aredescribed in the Appendix.
11. ..S!;l.e~ forexllmple, the listof 70companies in the sample stud·
iesbyRodriguez(1977).
12. To discover this group I relied heavily on articles in various
perio~icllisreportingupon the firms for which earnings were most
senllitivetofASB-8 anti exchange rate chllnges. Periodicals and
dlllesotliPpearanclilof arti.cles included, Barrons 12/6/76 and
8/8177; Business Week 1/26/76,9/6/76 and 6/20177; Chemi-
cal Week 3/9/77; and the Wall Street Journal 3/13/75 and
12/8/76.
13.•Enactment o.f FASB-8 required a major change in the account-
ing procedures lor virtually all multinationallirms examined, either
in the fOrl1l of termination of reserve accounts or a switch to
hilltoriclii/!:,urrenttranslation rates for inventory/long term debt
itemll onthe balanCe .sheet. A llurvey of such practices by Rodri-
guez (1977) showed that in 1975 only Pfizer (part of the chemicals
group)had adopted standards generally in line with those required
byFASB-8in Jllnullry.1976.
g.The mean ofth~ abl30lule differences betw~en overall and
"sensilive"earningll performance forlhe eight quarters of 1975-76
was25.2With a I3tandard deviation of 18.8.
t5.TheWaIlStre~tJOllrnal.ApriI29, 1976, p.12.
16..• VVerklyseriel3 of VVe!lnesday cl()sing prices were employed
tocalculateratesofchange ofshare prices.
17. Wednesday closing prices for the "sensitive" group were tak-
en fromStan!lard and Poor:sDallyStockPrice Record.18. The ligures reported in Table 3 reler to weekly returns which
must be compounded over 52 weeks to be converted to annual
rates.
19. Thislinding brings to mind the possible role played by loreign
exchange problems in explaining the recent sharp deterioration in
the value 01 Kodak's shares. Business Week ("The Market Man-
handles a Blue Chip," June 20, 1977) reported on the situation at
Kodak, indicl;iting the view 01 Kodak's management that, "We don't
think it is good management to try to protect against that (Ioreign
exchange) loss by taking out large overseas borrowings, which is
oneofthe devices usedtotryto ollsetthat." (p. 37)
20. When interpreting the results reported here, it is important to
remember that earnings reports measure net returns in terms 01
current dollars, and not necessarily in "real" terms. It is possible,
although not necessarily true, that an earnings stream which is
more volatile when measured in current-dollar terms is less volatile
in terms 01 its real purchasing power over some multinational (or
even national) basket 01 goods and services. In such a case, a rise
in nominal variability may not mean any rise in real risk, and hence
may not 'mean any rise in share prices. 01 course, if the bulk 01
investors buying shares corne Irom a single local-currency area
and concentrate their purchaaes on local goods, there is greater
likelihood 01 volatility in the real purchasing power as well as the
local-currency value 01 the earnings stream.
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